Lastly, your post about the "circular firing squad" is important and well-taken.  Sometimes, we conservatives forget that, once the primary is over, whomever we select is likely to be head and shoulders above the opposition.  Teamwork wins games and elections.

Especially, when it comes to DELE-GATE in Michigan, and across the United States, violation of Federal Election Law, or violations the Party's own rules mean diddly-squat-nothing because there will always be some legalese merchant on hand to threaten litigation jihad.

Oh, and there will be some rebuttal to the two cases that you've laid out so far.  Let me start with this  concurring opinion from Justice Markman on Progressive v. Smith (all emphasis in original):

MARKMAN, J. (concurring).

Although I reach the same result as the Chief Justice, and, even had I not, I would have articulated my position much differently than do the dissents in this Court and in the Court of Appeals, I nonetheless respectfully believe that the Chief Justice is overly severe in his criticism of these dissents.

The issue here is whether an insurance policy stating that an owner of an insured vehicle, under specified circumstances, remains "personally responsible" conforms with a statute requiring that all policies must communicate that an owner, under these circumstances, remains "personally liable."  In my judgment, plaintiff-insurer's insurance policy did not satisfy the statute because an exact identity in language is required in the instant circumstances, in which an insurance statute has specified precise language for inclusion in such a policy.  However, I also believe that this is a case in which a judge who adheres to the interpretative philosophy articulated by the Chief Justice, as do I, may quite reasonably disagree with his, and my, conclusion.  In fairly giving meaning to the law, the obligation of the "textualist" or "interpretivist" is not to read the law "literally" or "narrowly," or to engage in "strict construction," but it is simply to read the law "reasonably."  In light of this premise, I do not believe that either of the dissents has reached an indefensible conclusion.  A judge who views the difference between "liability" and "responsibility" as being of no reasonable consequence in the insurance policy at issue is not "ignoring words," engaging in a "shocking departure from the rule of law," or otherwise acting in disregard of his or her "oath of office."  Nor do I believe, as suggested by the Chief Justice's citation to People v McIntire, that a judge who undertakes within the most narrow realm to consider the genuine "absurdity" of a result is acting in violation of his or her judicial powers.  See Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 476 Mich 55, 78-86 (2006) (MARKMAN, J., concurring).  While I respect the Chief Justice's convictions -- and while I appreciate his apparently-approving references to my own past jurisprudential statements, to which I continue to adhere -- I also believe that there are many better cases in which to bring those convictions to bear.